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INTRODUCTION
Imagine being in an emergency or crisis-you need cash now that
you do not have. You are desperate to pay your mortgage and feel as
if you have nowhere to turn. Then you see an advertisement, a
company offering fast cash advances to help people just like you in
times of need! This advertisement, which is typical of payday lenders,
praises the various aspects of the product that make it perfect for you:
"[O]ur special qualification requirements ensure that you do not need
good credit;"' "Your repayment is the best part. The minimum
required payment will be deducted from your bank account;" 2 "Still a
little short on payday? No problem! Online customers are

* © 2012 Heather L. Petrovich.
1. GREENSTARCASH, https://www.greenstarcash.com/ (last visited Nov. 15,2012).
2. Frequently Asked Questions, AMERILOAN, https://ameriloan.com/?page=info-faq
(last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
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automatically renewed every pay period."3 Though you are hesitant,
thinking this product is too good to be true, you decide to cast aside
your reservations and apply. Scenarios similar to the one just
described cause many Americans to become victims of the predatory
practices of payday lenders.' Deceptive advertisements targeted at
desperate consumers frequently occur in the payday lending industry
because of the large profits companies generate from these abusive
and harmful tactics.
Although the desire for prosperity is a principle that drives our
economy, regulators have recognized that this desire does not come
without its risks. Before governments regulated the commercial
sector, businesses seeking to increase their profits commonly used
corrupt practices against consumers to gain an advantage over their
competitors.' In response, state and federal agencies emerged to
respond to these tactics by regulating businesses through consumer
protection laws.'
In addition to protecting the rights of consumers, the federal
government has historically protected the seemingly unrelated right
of Native American tribes to govern their own affairs. This right has
been essential to the relationship between the United States and
tribes since the eighteenth century. The federal government
characterizes Native American tribes as sovereign entities, "free from
state intrusion" on their right to self-governance." As colonists
immigrated to America, their encroachment on Indian lands created
tension in the relationship between the colonists and tribes.' To avoid
conflict, the federal government took control of Native American
3. Id.
4. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders Join with Indian Tribes,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article
one
woman's
(describing
/SB10001424052748703716904576134304155106320.html
experience with payday lenders in Virginia).
5. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER
PROTECTION INTHE STATES 6 (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car-sales/UDAP
.Report_Feb09.pdf.; Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration,
Cooperation,Control,and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1,77-78 (2003).
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (9th ed. 2009) (defining consumer protection
laws as "state or federal statute[s] designed to protect consumers against unfair trade and
credit practices involving consumer goods, as well as to protect consumers against faulty
and dangerous goods").
7. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74 (4th ed.
2004) ("The Trade and Intercourse Acts [passed between 1790 and 1834] made no attempt
to regulate the conduct of Indians among themselves in Indian country; that subject was
left entirely to the tribes.").
8. Id. at 74-75.
9. Id. at 12.

328

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

affairs10 and recognized Indian tribes as "distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil."" The federal government
continues to regard Native American self-governance as a highly
protected interest, which has allowed this relationship to persist over
time.12
In most modern contexts, the interests of consumers and tribes
typically coexist without conflict. However, these interests have
recently collided, causing problems for regulators. In the normal
course of governance, state regulators take the primary role in
protecting consumers through the enactment of consumer protection
laws.13 It is this important role of state regulators in protecting
consumers, however, which has led to the new collision of interests.
As new consumer threats emerge, state agencies quickly respond
with regulation and enforcement to combat those threats.' 4 Yet, the
emergence of a new threat-tribally owned Internet payday lending
companies-has halted state enforcement efforts. Although the
federal government has not yet regulated the payday lending
industry," consumer advocates have concluded that payday loans are
unfair and abusive to consumers," which has led states to be
particularly active in regulating the industry." While some states have
restricted the terms of these loans to make their effect on consumers
less harmful, others have eliminated the payday loan industry
entirely."'
Characteristically, payday lenders adapt quickly to new
consumer protection efforts by coming up with schemes to get around

10. Id.
11. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), superseded by, various state
Enabling Acts, as recognized in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
12. See CANBY, supra note 7, at 75.
13. See CARTER, supra note 5, at 6; Colin Provost, State Attorneys General,
Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM, Spring 2003, at 37-38 (describing the regulation shift from the federal
government to the states in the 1970s).
14. See CARTER, supra note 5, at 6.

15. See Nathalie Martin, Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB's Short
List, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 47-48 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Martin-Payday-Loans.pdf.
16. See, e.g., id. at 48-49.
17. See id. at 47-48.
18. See generally Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big
Problems: How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government
Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31 (2011) (examining state regulation of payday
lenders).
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restrictions.19 Until recently, states have responded quickly and
successfully to nullify these attempts.20 Nonetheless, the latest method
of circumventing state laws through tribally owned payday lenders
may prove to be an exception to this norm, leaving states ill-equipped
to protect consumers.
Tribal ownership of a company creates an obstacle for states due
to the doctrine of Native American tribal immunity, which limits state
control over tribes." Under federal law, immunity prohibits states
from bringing enforcement actions against federally recognized
Indian tribes or the businesses that they own. 22 Instead, the authority
to enforce regulations against the tribes belongs solely to the federal
government.23 Because states exclusively regulate payday lending 24
and may not bring enforcement actions against tribes, tribally owned
lenders escape regulation, leaving them free to market harmful
products to consumers.25 Without federal regulation addressing this
issue, tribal companies can evade laws applicable to other payday
lenders while state regulators are powerless to stop them.
Tribal lenders who argue against enforcement highlight the
importance of tribal economic development to their selfdetermination.2 6 However, in the context of Internet payday lending,
this argument has less force than it has in the past. For example, in
the case of businesses such as Native American-owned casinos, which
are located mostly on tribal land, consumers are aware of the
company's tribal ownership and the business activity is geographically
contained.2 7 Internet tribal payday lenders, by contrast, offer their
19. See Martin, supra note 15, at 47-48 (describing the practice of payday lenders
devising new schemes to get around consumer protection laws).
20. See id.
21. See CONFERENCE OF W. ATr'YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK

288-89 (Clay Smith et al. eds., 4th ed. 2008).
22. See id at 288 ("A core element of tribal sovereignty is a common law immunity
from suit against all but the federal government.").
23. Id.
24. See Martin, supra note 15, at 47-48 (noting that "[n]umerous states have made
regulating payday loans a priority" and asserting that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau has the authority to join in regulating payday loans if it chooses).
25. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.
26. See, e.g., Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 576 (Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that the lending business was formed "for the purpose of supplying a selfsustaining and diversified stream of revenues for the tribe"); Silver-Greenberg, supra note
4 ("[T]he chief of the Modoc tribe in Miami, Okla., said getting into the payday-loan
business has generated jobs that are a welcome addition to the tribal-owned
[businesses].").
27. See Brian C. Lake, Note, The Unlimited Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribal
Businesses Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 1996
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products online to consumers anywhere in the United States, many of
whom are completely unaware of the company's tribal ownership. 8
To make matters worse, many regulators believe that tribal lenders
organize under "rent-a-tribe" schemes,29 where existing nontribal
lenders "affiliat[e] with tribes . . . to skirt existing laws and
oversight."'o
As tribal payday lending becomes more prevalent, there is a dire
need for federal action to halt the trend's momentum. In 2010, tribal
payday lenders made up "[m]ore than 35 of the 300" Internet payday
lenders and made "about $420 million in payday loans."3 1 The need
for regulation of this conduct is imminent-"[slome observers predict
that the number of tribes with payday-loan operations eventually
could climb close to the 400 that now have casinos."3 2 Additionally,
various lenders have shown an interest in copying the tribal lending
business model, which will likely result in additional industry
growth." In the absence of federal regulation, the number of
companies targeting consumers will increase, rendering previous state
regulation efforts futile.
This Comment argues that federal action is necessary to block
attempts by payday lenders to bypass consumer protection laws by
organizing as tribal entities. Because the federal government does not
currently regulate payday lending and tribes are immune from state
suit, states are unable to protect their consumers from the practices
that they have previously fought to curtail. Due to these obstacles,
this Comment proposes possible solutions that can prevent tribal
payday lending companies from circumventing state consumer
protection laws. Part I provides background information introducing
the specific problems that states have encountered in their initial
COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 87, 88 (1996) (arguing that unlimited sovereignty should not be
extended to off-reservation tribal businesses because conditions that apply only to offreservation businesses would result in unfairness to third parties).
2& See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4 (noting that one borrower was unaware that
her loan was coming from an Indian tribe).
29. Karen K. Harris & Kelly Ward, Rent-a-Tribe Payday Lenders, THE SHRIVER
2011),
http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2011/02/articles/assetBRIEF
(Feb.
14,
opportunity/asset-building/rentatribe-payday-lenders/.
30. Amy Biegelsen, Maryland Challenges Online Payday Lender Owned by Tribal
3:09 PM),
21, 2011,
Member, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar.
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/03/21/3692/maryland-challenges-online-paydaylender-owned-tribal-member.
31. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.
32. Id.
33. See id. ("In the past 18 months, more than 1,000 payday lenders have expressed
interest in cloning the strategy used at the Overland Park call center. . . .").
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regulation efforts against these companies. Part II describes why
tribal payday lending cases are so rare and analyzes this body of case
law. Part III analyzes why state regulation is inadequate and the
reasoning behind the need for a federal response to this practice.
Finally, Part IV examines what courses of action may be taken and
which of those proposals are most likely to quickly and effectively
address the problem.
I. INTERSECTION OF PAYDAY LENDING AND TRIBAL IMMUNITY

Payday Lending
The harmful lending structure of payday loans has caused many
state regulators to take action to combat these abusive practices.
Payday loans uniquely combine very high interest rates, short loan
periods, and small loan amounts in a way that, many times, leaves
consumers in a debt trap.34 Typically, the process requires the
borrower to provide an advance check or an authorization to directly
debit money from a personal account as a promise to repay the loan
in full, plus a large lender fee, at some future date." When the loan is
due for repayment, the lender notifies the borrower of his intention to
process the advance payment or direct debit, though many borrowers
are unable to repay the loan amount in full. 3 6 In an effort to avoid
fees for bounced checks or overdrafts, the borrower can agree to an
additional lender fee to extend the loan, which he is also often unable
to pay. This process traps the borrower in a debt cycle as the
borrower continually adds fees to the loan in an effort to keep the
existing loan outstanding."
The need for payday loan regulation arises as a result of payday
lenders' predatory lending methods and practices. 8 When applying
for a traditional loan, the lender evaluates the borrower's ability to
repay before the lender is willing to fund the loan. The lender will not
fund a loan if the lender believes that the borrower will be unable to

A.

34. See LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, LEAH A. PLUNKETT & CAROLYN CARTER, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP 4 (2010) (describing the
characteristics of payday loans).
35. Payday Lending: How the Debt Trap Catches Borrowers, CENTER FOR
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/toolsLENDING,
RESPONSIBLE
resources/debttrap.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Debt Trap].
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. See generally Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 18 (arguing that states, Congress,
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should work together to regulate smalldollar lending).
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repay the loan according to its terms." However, in the payday loan
industry, this initial evaluation does not take place. In fact, payday
lenders characteristically target poor Americans, who are less likely
to repay their loan in full, which increases the lender's revenue
through extensive charges. 0 The Federal Reserve Board reported in
2007 that the median income of payday borrowers was just above
$30,000.41 By targeting these vulnerable borrowers-namely those
consumers who are poor, elderly, minorities, or dependent on
government benefit programs for their main source of income4lenders profit by providing loans to individuals who are likely unable
to pay them back.43 As stated above, when a consumer finds himself
unable to pay back a loan, he will typically extend his loan to avoid
default."
The payday loan industry's practice of attracting repeat
borrowers is incredibly profitable.4 5 The Center for Responsible
Lending, reporting on loan data generated from public records, found
that "more than 80 percent of borrowers ... take out more than one
payday loan a year." 46 Focusing on these repeat borrowers, the study
found that borrowers "open new loans in rapid succession, with 87
percent of all new loans to these borrowers occurring during the very
next pay period." 47 Borrowers who immediately take out new loans
during their next pay period account "for three-fourths of all payday
loan volume ... totaling more than $20 billion" in loans and "$3.5
billion in fees each year." 48
Additionally, payday loans come with exorbitantly high interest
rates-running from "391% to 782%."49 Lenders pair such interest
39. Debt Trap, supranote 35.
40. See SAUNDERS, PLUNKETT & CARTER, supra note 34, at 4 (noting that payday
lenders "use specialized credit reporting services that track the subprime market" and
depend largely on those who take out new loans to pay off previous payday loans).
41. Id. at 5.
42. See id.; Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina:Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 267 (2007) (describing typical payday loan
borrowers).
43. SAUNDERS, PLUNKETT & CARTER, supra note 34, at 4.

44. See Debt Trap, supra note 35.
45. See id. (describing the profitability of repeat customers for payday loan
companies); see also SAUNDERS, PLUNKETT & CARTER, supra note 34, at 4.
46. LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, PHANTOM DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE
DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF

TOTAL VOLUME 2 (July 9, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/paydaylending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 3.
49. SAUNDERS, PLUNKETr, & CARTER, supra note 34, at 4.
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rates with a complete lack of transparency in loan terms, leaving the
majority of borrowers unaware of the actual terms of their lending
agreements. 0 As a result, payday loan borrowers frequently allege
that their lender failed to disclose various harmful loan terms before
they entered into the agreement."
Meanwhile, payday lenders deny the findings of consumer
advocates and insist that they market their loans to middle-class
Americans as short-term relief in rare times of crisis.52 Despite the
contentions of industry leaders, the facts above stand in direct
opposition to these claims.5 3 Lenders also argue that payday loans are
beneficial to consumers-by providing emergency cash to consumers
without other options, lenders help borrowers avoid overdrawing
their accounts.54 However, it is inaccurate to depict most borrowers as
without other options; research suggests that "payday borrowers tend
to have a variety of options besides taking [a] payday loan or
incurring an overdraft fee.""
States have reacted to the harmful practices of payday lenders by
restricting or eliminating payday lending through regulation of loan
terms, amounts, costs, fees, annual percentage rates ("APR"), and the
number of loans a person may take out. 56 Many states also have
interest rate caps that apply to all loans. Previously, before states fully
realized the dangers of payday lending, payday lenders successfully
lobbied for exemptions from these caps." As the harmful effects of
these loans became more apparent to lawmakers, many states
eliminated these exemptions. 8 States that have banned the payday
loan industry or capped interest rates have been extremely successful
in protecting consumers from payday lenders." If tribal lenders
50. Martin,supra note 15, at 46-47.
51. See id.; see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1, 119-20 (2002).
52. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LOANS PUT FAMILIES IN THE
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research(Feb. 2009),
1
RED
analysis/payday-puts-families-in-the-red-final.pdf [hereinafter FAMILIES IN THE RED].
53. See supratext accompanying notes 40-48.
54. FAMILIES IN THE RED, supra note 52, at 1.
55. Id.
56. See generally Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 18 (examining state regulation of
payday lenders).
57. SAUNDERS, PLUNKETT & CARTER, supra note 34, at 10.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 10-11 ("Currently, 14 jurisdictions-soon to be 15-either ban payday
loans or subject them to an interest rate cap of 36% annual percentage rate ("APR") or
less. Some of these states permit an origination fee, but the APR for a two-week, sixmonth, and 12-month loan is well below triple-digits in all of those states even with the fee
included.").

334

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

remain unregulated, these successful state efforts to protect
consumers will likely have been in vain.
B.

TribalImmunity
Tribal immunity significantly hinders the State's ability to
effectively regulate tribal payday lenders. Since colonization,
American governments have considered Native American tribes to be
"domestic dependent nations"' that retain the right of selfgovernance over their lands.' Due to the sovereign nature of tribes,
the United States Supreme Court developed the doctrine of Native
American tribal immunity in United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guarantee Co.62 Under this doctrine, Native American tribes are
generally immune from suit in any court unless they consent to being
subject to jurisdiction. 3 Though this domestic dependent status grants
tribal immunity from suit, Congress has always retained plenary
control over tribal affairs.'
While the Constitution protects Native American property
interests, there is no such constitutional right to sovereign immunity.
Thus, Congress has the power to limit tribal immunity through
legislation.65 However, it is overwhelmingly clear that this power to
intrude into tribal affairs does not extend to the states.66 The
prohibition against state laws being applied to tribes prevents states
without tribal territory from undermining the tribal right to selfgovernance.67 Based on these standards, the Supreme Court in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe68 barred suits against tribes "absent a clear waiver by the tribe
or congressional abrogation." 69 Regarding tribal activity outside of
tribal territory, however, states are free to regulate tribal conduct
where federal law does not preempt them from doing so."

60. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
61. CONFERENCE OF W. Arr'YS GEN., supra note 21, at 287.

62. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
63. See id. at 514.
64. See CANBY, supra note 7, at 93.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 87 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has almost always held the line against
permitting state law to apply to Indians in Indian country.").
67. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
68. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
69. Id. at 509.
70. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998) ("We have
recognized that a State may have authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring
within the State but outside Indian country.").
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As tribes increasingly began to engage in commercial activity,
regulators argued that immunity should not protect this activity on
the grounds that it was "so detached from traditional tribal interests
that the ... doctrine no longer ma[de] sense."" Initially, Justice
Stevens stated that it was unclear whether the doctrine required
immunity to protect commercial activity outside of tribal territory.7 2
However, the Supreme Court subsequently clarified Justice Stevens'
assertion by adamantly confirming that tribal immunity applies
equally to commercial activity, even activities occurring outside of
tribal land.73 Thus, while states technically have the authority to
"regulate" tribal activity outside of tribal land, states may not enforce
these regulations because tribes are immune from state
The Court in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
enforcement.
Technologies, Inc. explained the state authority to regulate tribes by
noting that "[tihere is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce
them."'
While the Supreme Court holds that tribes are immune from
suits based on their commercial activities, 6 this immunity applies only
to the tribe itself and to "arms of the tribe."77 The tribe's immunity
does not protect businesses that are completely independent of the
tribe. While this standard is clear, it is difficult for state courts to
determine when a company is an "arm of the tribe" for various
reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has not established a test for courts to
determine when a business entity is an "arm of the tribe" and thus
entitled to the tribe's immunity. Because raising a tribal immunity
defense does not confer independent federal question jurisdiction, the
71. Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 510.
72. Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760 ("Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts,
whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they
were made on or off a reservation.").
74. See id. at 755 ("There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with
state laws and the means available to enforce them.").
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 578 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citing Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754) (acknowledging the Supreme Court's position that
"[a]n Indian tribe's sovereign nation status confers an absolute immunity from suit in
federal or state court, absent an express waiver of that immunity or congressional
authorization to sue").
77. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 7.05[1][a),
at 636 (2005).
78. See id.

336

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

defense leaves state courts to determine the relationship between the
business entity and the tribe.' This has resulted in the use of different
test in different states to determine whether a business is an "arm of
the tribe" and thus protected by the tribe's immunity. 0 Although
courts may use the factors in different ways,8 ' they normally look to
some combination of these factors to determine whether a tribe's
immunity protects a business entity: (1) "[wlhether a judgment
against the tribal entity will reach the tribe's assets," (2) "[w]hether
the tribal entity has the power to bind the tribe's assets or to obligate
tribal funds," (3) "[w]hether the tribe and the tribal entity are closely
linked through governance structure and other characteristics," (4)
"[wjhether federal Indian law policies intended to promote tribal selfdetermination would be furthered by extending immunity to the
entity," (5) "[w]hether the entity is organized for governmental or for
'commercial' purposes," (6) "[w]hether the entity holds title to
property in its own name," and (7) "[w]hether the entity is legally
separate and distinct from the tribe." 82 Because each state court
employs a different test to determine the status of a business entity,
contradictory outcomes may result for the same company in different
states."
Second, the various structures used to incorporate tribal
businesses further complicate the state courts' determinations.
Corporations may organize under the Federal Indian Reorganization
Act,' tribal corporate law, or state corporate law. Courts are split
over whether to treat corporations organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act as arms of the tribe; some have held that tribal
immunity extends to the business activities of those corporations,
whereas others have found the "sue and be sued" clause of the
corporate charter to function as a waiver of immunity.86 To form a
corporation under federal law, the tribe must apply to the Secretary
79. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989) ("[Tlhe existence of a
federal immunity to the claims asserted does not convert a suit otherwise arising under
state law into one which, in the statutory sense, arises under federal law.").
80. See KAREN J. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN M. NILLES, OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY
& ECON. DEV., TRIBAL BUSINESS STRUcTURE HANDBOOK A-1 (2008),
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lpsl25418/tribal-business-structure_handbook.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 550
U.S. 931 (2007) (No. 06-1229), 2007 WL 737603 at *16 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of
Certiorari].
84. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006).
85. ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 80, 1-5 to 1-6.
86. Id. at I-5.
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of the Interior, who scrutinizes its application and makes a
determination of the business's status as an "arm of the tribe.""
Although this process is more difficult than incorporating under tribal
law, once a business is characterized as an "arm of the tribe,"
immunity automatically attaches.88 In contrast, businesses chartered
under tribal law are beneficial to the corporation because "they are
relatively easy to establish compared to federally chartered
corporations."8 9 Under tribal law, a corporation follows whatever
incorporation process the tribe requires and is not first scrutinized by
the federal or a state government. Because companies that organize
under tribal law do not undergo any scrutiny by federal or state
governments, it seems illogical for courts to use the same test to
determine tribal ownership of federally chartered and tribally
chartered corporations-however, courts tend to do so.' As a result,
courts generally consider tribally organized corporations immune
from state regulation."
Finally, after tribal corporations are organized, they may evolve
into various business entities and diminish the business's connection
to the tribe.' It is unlikely that any court would deem these evolved
entities "arms of the tribe," but because tribal immunity extends to
the discovery phase of litigation, courts are unable to investigate the
disconnected nature of the evolved businesses.
Although the federal government originally considered tribal
immunity necessary to "promote tribal self-government and
economic development," 93 in recent years, the Supreme Court has
questioned the doctrine's continued propriety.' In questioning tribal
immunity, the Court acknowledged that "tribal immunity extends
beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance."" In the
context of contemporary commerce, it was evident to the Court that
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 111-1.
90. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 13.
91. See ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 80, at III-1. ("[Tlribally chartered
corporations, unlike state chartered entities, are considered to be largely exempt from
state regulation....").
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 13.
93. CONFERENCE OF W. ATT'YS GEN., supra note 21, at 290 (citing Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991)).
94. See id.; see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1997) (stating
that "there are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine"); Citizen Band,
498 U.S. at 514 (lamenting that "[tihe doctrine of sovereign immunity is founded upon an
anachronistic fiction" (Stevens, J., concurring)).
95. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758.
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this doctrine is overly broad.' Today, unlike when the Court created
the doctrine, tribal businesses have influence outside tribal territory
and "operate in an increasingly commercial climate affecting large
numbers of consumers."" In addition to the overly broad use of the
doctrine, the Court also acknowledged that providing this immunity
to businesses may be harmful to consumers who are "unaware that
they are dealing with a tribe" that they are unable to sue."
Although the Court acknowledged the need for dispensing with
the tribal immunity doctrine in some instances, it continues to
confirm that it is "Congress, not the courts" that should determine
when to abandon the doctrine.9 9 Thus, it is essential for the federal
government to develop regulations to combat the consumer harms
that can occur from the unregulated nature of tribal business entities.
II. LIMITED CASE LAW ADDRESSING TRIBAL LENDING

Although many states recognize that tribal payday lending
companies circumvent state consumer protection laws,1" the matter
has produced minimal case law for two reasons. First, regulators have
found that tribal businesses simply do not respond to court
enforcement actions.10 ' Second, immunity is a jurisdictional
question, 10oand state courts dismiss cases due to lack of jurisdiction. 0a
While the Supreme Court has held that tribes are subject to state
laws for their activities off the reservation, their immunity still
protects them from state enforcement actions based on those laws.'04
Immunity from state enforcement actions includes protection from
"state investigatory actions with respect to alleged violations of state
96. Id.
97. Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal Rptr. 3d 572, 582 (Ct. App. 2008).
98. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758.
99. Ameriloan, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582 (discussing Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760, and
Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 514).
100. See David Heath, Payday Lending Bankrolls Auto Racer's Fortune, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/26/6605/paydaylending-bankrolls-auto-racers-fortune; see also Silver-Greenberg,supra note 4 (noting that
"[t]ribal lenders can even lend in the twelve U.S. states where lawmakers have kicked out
the rest of the payday loan industry").
101. See Ameriloan, 86 Cal Rptr. 3d at 576; Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v.
State ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 1099, 1103 (Colo. 2010).
102. See CONFERENCE OF W. Arr'Ys GEN., supra note 21, at 289; see also Cash
Advance, 242 P.3d at 1102 (holding "tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature").
103. See generally United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the district court property quashed a subpoena against a tribe on tribal immunity
grounds).
104. See generally Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505 (rejecting a state tax enforcement action).
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law.""os Thus, tribes are able to avoid punishment for failing to
comply with state investigatory actions, such as subpoenas and
discovery requests. 0 6 Knowing that immunity protects against such
actions, regulators have found that tribal businesses largely ignore
subpoenas issued against them.' This leads to reluctance by state
regulators to allocate time and resources to commence these actions,
fearing that such actions will waste resources and be ignored.a 8 In a
few states, namely North Carolina and Washington, regulators have
given up fighting tribal payday lenders, realizing that the legal battle
would be too expensive and complicated. 09
It is not surprising that states hold this belief, considering the
legal battle playing out in Colorado against two payday lenders that
has continued since 2004.110 Only a few cases have successfully
reached courts. In these cases, regulators either have held the
corporation in contempt"' or have brought actions against individuals
who are not members of the tribe but are associated with the tribal
corporation. 112 However, even in cases that have actually managed to
reach the courtroom, tribal companies often moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction due to tribal immunity."'3 These cases have been
unsuccessful in vindicating consumers' rights because, upon raising
the jurisdiction issue, courts dismiss the complaints." 4 Currently, only
two cases have advanced far enough in state courts to reach any

105. Cash Advance, 242 P.3d at 1108.
106. Id.
107. See id at 1103 (stating that this enforcement action commenced after the
defendant lending company repeatedly ignored subpoenas). For a detailed account of the
allegations against Cash Advance, see David Heath, Race Car Driver Scott Tucker Drew
an Elaborate Fagade Around His Payday Loan Businesses, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/28/6656/race-car-driver-scotttucker-drew-elaborate-facade-around-his-payday-loan-businesses (reporting that Tucker's
attorney wrote that Tucker would continue ignoring the state's subpoenas).
10& See Heath, supra note 107, at 8 (stating that some states claim that they do not
have the resources or expertise to fight predatory payday lenders affiliated with tribes).
109. Heath, supra note 100.
110. Id.
111. Cash Advance, 242 P.3d at 1103.
112. See State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389,
402-04 (Colo. App. 2008) (enforcing subpoenas against director of lending businesses in
addition to tribes).
113. See Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal Rptr. 3d 572, 576 (Ct. App. 2008); Cash
Advance, 205 P.3d at 408-09.
114. See, e.g., State v. Cash Advance, No. 05CV1143, at 27, 2012 WL 3113527 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 18, 2012); Petition for Review and Request for Stay at 16-17, Baillie v.
Account Receivable Mgmt. of Fla., 2011 Cal. LEXIS 6622 (June 29, 2011) (No. S194110),
2011 CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1013 at *26-27.
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discussion on the merits-despite the fact that various other states
have attempted to bring similar actions.I"
In Ameriloan v. Superior Court,"6 the California Department of
Corporations sought preliminary injunctions against five payday
lenders to stop them from doing business with California residents
after these companies ignored various cease-and-desist orders."' The
court then issued a show-cause order against these companies after it
opposed the preliminary injunctions."18 A subdivision of the Miami
Tribe of Oklahoma specially appeared and moved to quash based on
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'1 9 The tribe claimed that they
established the businesses "for the purpose of supplying a selfsustaining and diversified stream of revenues for the tribe." 20 The
trial court agreed with the Department's argument that sovereign
immunity did not apply to off-reservation commercial activities, and it
denied the tribe's motion to quash. 2 ' However, the appellate court
disagreed, holding that tribal immunity extends to tribes' offreservation commercial conduct, and the ability of states to regulate
tribal conduct off the reservation does not mean that tribes are not
immune from enforcement.122 The court then remanded the case for
limited discovery "directed solely to matters affecting the tribal
court's subject matter jurisdiction" to determine if the companies
function as "arms of the tribe."'
In Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado,'2 4 the
Colorado Attorney General sued two payday-lending companies for
failing to comply with investigative subpoenas issued in relation to the
company's transactions with Colorado consumers.'25 After the
companies ignored the trial court's order to enforce the subpoenas,
115. For further reporting on how regulators in Maryland, West Virginia, and New
Mexico have attempted to bring tribally affiliated payday lenders into court, see Biegelsen,
supra note 30; Michael Hudson & David Heath, Debt and Tribal Payday Lenders, DAILY
YONDER
(FEB.
13,
2011),
www.dailyyonder.com/debt-and-tribal-paydaylenders/2011/02/11/3177; Zac Taylor, Payday Lender Can't Hide Behind Indian Tribe
Status,
Judge
Says,
CHARLESTON
GAZETrE
(Nov.
16,
2011),
http://sundaygazettemail.com/News/201111160149.
116. 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572.
117. Id. at 575-76.
118. Id. at 576.
119. Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 579 (citing Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1997)).
Id.
242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010).
Id. at 1103.
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the court issued contempt citations to the two companies.126 The
companies responded to the contempt citations by filing a motion to
dismiss, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
companies were "wholly owned subdivisions of federally recognized
Indian tribes."' 2 7 The trial court withheld ruling on the motion to
dismiss for two years while the State compiled information about the
companies' relations to the Indian tribes.128 During this time, the
companies voluntarily complied with the State's requests for
documents while also continuing to claim that they sufficiently
established their immunity protection.129 Upon review of the
documents, the trial court noted that immunity does not protect
against investigative subpoenas and denied the motion to dismiss.13 0
However, on appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court overturned the
trial court's denial of immunity for investigatory actions.13 ' The court
found that, because the companies voluntarily allowed extensive
discovery initially, they waived their immunity with respect to
discovery requests for determining the relationship between the
lenders and the tribe. 132 This waiver gave the State broader access to
discovery documents than they would typically have had to establish
jurisdiction."' The court then remanded the case to determine
whether the businesses were acting as "arms of the tribe" when
conducting business." On remand, the action was dismissed based on
the company's sovereign immunity.135
III. WHY IS STATE REGULATION INADEQUATE?

The decisions discussed above do not provide much additional
guidance about how states should approach tribally owned
companies, but they do shed light on the problems that have led to
the failure of state enforcement efforts against these lenders. Further,
these decisions help to clarify the need for a federal response by

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1104.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1108.
132. Id. at 1115.
133. Id. (noting that "[tlhe tribal entities' voluntary disclosure of some information
functions as a limited waiver of their immunity with respect to all information").
134. Id.
135. State v. Cash Advance, No. 05CV 143, 2012 WL 3113527, at *3 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 18, 2012).
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highlighting that state regulation efforts are inadequate in combating
these abuses.
A.

Rent-A-Tribe Schemes
While legitimate tribal businesses' potential ability to circumvent
consumer protection laws seems unjust in itself, the problem is
compounded by the fact that a majority of state regulators believe
that these companies are not actually owned by Indian tribes. Rather,
regulators believe that many of these businesses are sham businesses
that use a so-called "rent-a-tribe" scheme.' Such schemes involve
payday lenders offering tribes compensation to allow the company to
organize under the tribe's name, while the lenders maintain
functional control of the entity. 3 7 Typically, a payday lender will
reorganize an existing company under a tribe's name in exchange for
monthly payments to the tribe-usually a percentage of monthly
profits.138 These impoverished tribes often accept these arrangements;
yet, they seldom get a significant cut of the amount of money
generated by the tribal ownership of these companies.13 Observers
claim "most payday lenders have no physical presence on tribal land;"
instead, they operate from call centers in distinct locations.140
Affiliating under a tribe allows payday lenders to continue the
harmful practices that regulators previously ceased and allows the
company to escape state regulation completely or stall the process for

years.141
In Colorado v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, the
Colorado Attorney General's office uncovered evidence of this
practice as part of their investigation into Cash Advance.' 42 Colorado
claimed that Cash Advance Loans, which was originally owned by
Scott Tucker, is a sham business that uses the tribe as a shield for
regulation.'43 Regulators alleged that Mr. Tucker sold his business to
136. David Heath, Courts Debate Validity of Indian-owned Payday Lenders, CENTER
(Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/12/20/7716
/courts-debate-validity-indian-owned-payday-lenders.
137. Id. For further reporting detailing the process of how payday lenders affiliate with
tribes to claim sovereign immunity, see Alicia Caldwell, Payday Lenders Are Able to Get
Around State Regulations by Claiming Sovereign Immunity, DENVER POST (Feb. 13,
2011), www.denverpost.com/opinionci_17355660.
138. See Heath, supra note 136.
139. See id.
140. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.
141. Caldwell, supra note 137.
142. See Heath, supranote 136.
143. Id.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
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the Miami tribe in 2008 due to pressures from regulators to shut it
down." Curiously, the Miami tribe only paid $120,000 for the
business, although when they purchased it the company was grossing
up to $20 million per month. 145 Additionally, Colorado claims to have
evidence, based on Tucker's emails, indicating that Tucker sought out
a tribe to "buy" the company after Colorado initially brought
enforcement actions in 2004.16 Currently, Tucker identifies himself as
a mere employee of the business, yet he seems to remain in control of
the company's bank account.14 Based on discovery documents,
Colorado asserted that the tribe received a mere one percent of the
company's revenue from those accounts.148
The number of companies seeking to organize under tribal law
further evidences the existence of the "rent-a-tribe" model. Payday
loan consultants14 9 acknowledge a recent boom in the tribal payday
lending business model;1s0 one consultant claims that "more than
1,000 payday lenders have expressed interest in cloning the
strategy.""' Additionally, various web-based payday loan consultants
on the Internet offer instructions to payday lenders, advising them
how to organize with Indian tribes to evade state regulation efforts. 151
One website, Consultants4Tribes.com, even brags about its success,
claiming, "At the current time, we have linked six PDLs with three
federally recognized tribes."' These sites highlight the absurdity of
the practice and make a mockery of regulators' enforcement efforts.
Notwithstanding the abundant evidence, state regulators face
extreme difficulty in proving that these companies are not tribal
entities, but rather fronts for existing payday lending companies. The
difficulty for regulators originates from tribal companies moving to
dismiss regulatory actions by claiming lack of jurisdiction based on
tribal immunity. Once these actions are dismissed, regulators no
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Payday lending consultants offer advice for starting businesses, running
businesses,
and
maximizing
profit.
See,
e.g.,
RGMI
CONSULTING,
http://www.rgmiconsulting.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
150. See id.
151. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.
152. See, e.g., CONSULTANTS4TRIBES.COM (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); RGMI
CONSULTING, supra note 149.

Payday
Lenders,
Validity
of
Indian-owned
153. Courts
Debate
CONSULTANTS4TRIBES.COM (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.consultants4tribes.com/courtsdebate-validity-of-indian-owned-payday-lenders/.
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longer have access to information that could be gathered through
discovery, which would help states prove their cases. When a tribal
company files a motion to dismiss, "the state bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the companies] are
not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity."' 54 However, this burden is
typically extremely difficult for states to overcome because discovery
is limited, which makes it difficult to determine if a company is an
"arm of the tribe."" Courts allow a conservative amount of discovery
due to the recognition that immunity protects immune parties from
bearing the burden of even pretrial matters."' Adding to the
complication, many regulators believe that these businesses
manipulate documents to falsely convey that the business has the
requisite connection to the tribe.'
Without further discovery,
regulators cannot prove the inconsistencies in the documents that
convey the true nature of these businesses. Based on the Cash
Advance discovery information above, it appears that the Colorado
Attorney General was able to conduct extensive discovery; however,
this case goes far beyond the typical discovery allowed in immunity
cases due to Cash Advance's voluntary waiver of discovery
immunity.15
The information available about corporations organized under
tribal law is even more limited than other corporations owned by
tribes because these corporations are not subject to the same
disclosure requirements as corporations organized under state law.' 59
Even if courts decide to acquire information concerning its
jurisdiction, the inquiry will likely be minimal.16 0 Once a court is
satisfied that the corporation is a tribal entity on its face, it will likely
determine that it has no jurisdiction.16' Technically, then, all tribes
have to do is hide incriminating documents well enough at the outset
to escape regulation. As these loopholes continue to become
154. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado, 242 P.3d 1099, 1113 (Colo.
2010).
155. Id. at 1114 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173 (1977)).
This limitation is a function of the fact that discovery requests may be "directed solely to
matters affecting the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction." See Ameriloan v. Superior
Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 586 (Ct. App. 2008).
156. Cash Advance, 242 P.3d at 1114 (citing Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 173).
157. See Heath, supra note 100.
158. See supra Part IL.
159. See generally ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 80, at 111-1 (contrasting the
procedures tribes must comply with in order to incorporate a business based on tribal law
with the procedures required for chartering a tribal business under federal law).
160. See id. at A-1.
161. Id. ("In some jurisdictions, if the answers are 'no,' the inquiry ends.").
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apparent to payday lenders, it is obvious why observers predict an
escalation in the number of tribally affiliated companies.
B. Ploys to Conceal Ownership
Even if these discovery obstacles were nonexistent and easily
discoverable information existed, it is not clear that regulators could
prove that these rent-a-tribe organizations exist. Companies have
further complicated matters for regulators by using various schemes
to conceal their true ownership. The Better Business Bureau has
observed lenders causing substantial damage by regularly changing
office locations-describing these abandoned locations as "ghost
companies." 6 2 Other lenders employ outside call centers, many times
in other states, which often cater to payday lenders by completely
running the business."6 '
However, the most complicated and elaborate ploy to conceal
ownership happens when lenders create shell companies. This occurs
when one person creates a business and claims to be the chief
executive officer, but in actuality has no affiliation with the
business.1" The Colorado Attorney General's office discovered an
alarming example of this practice during its investigation into Cash
Advance.'6 Joseph Fontano, a witness examined by the Attorney
General's office, admitted to accepting a small fee from Cash
Advance in exchange for creating and acting as the CEO of a "shell
company."6 Fontana admitted to providing similar services to many
companies that attempted to hide their businesses from regulators.16 1
Given the elaborate systems set up to conceal the identity of these
companies, it is no wonder that state regulators are reluctant, if not
unwilling, to invest their limited time and resources into these
companies-knowing that it is likely a losing battle.
C. Failureto Reveal Tribal Ownership
Considering that most tribally owned payday lenders are
internet-based, the ultimate owner of these websites is often

162. Tim Leeds, Online Payday Lending PracticesSpark Nationwide Concerns,HAVRE
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.havredailynews.com/cms/news/story165439.htmi.
163. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4.
164. See Heath, supra note 100.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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unclear. 1s Many of these websites go by trade names and do not
reveal ownership information.' 9 Most of the trade names used by
companies-such as Cash Advance, Western Sky, and Preferred Cash
Loans-offer no indication of tribal ownership. Given these trade
names, it therefore seems illogical to assume that the typical
consumer would have any idea that tribes own these companies.
While the Better Business Bureau recommends that consumers
research lenders to protect themselves before entering into contracts,
it also acknowledges that this can be extremely difficult with internet
lenders, noting that "some payday lenders work under a variety of
different business names and websites." 7 0 To further complicate
matters, several lenders may operate under the same company
17
name.n
While some companies, such as Western Sky,172 make it known
that they are tribally affiliated, even when the company discloses or
borrowers discover the connection, many consumers have no idea
how this relationship affects the transaction-either because the
consumer does not inquire about the effect or the tribe is unwilling to
disclose certain information. Regulators report that tribally owned
companies conceal information concerning fees and interest rates,
default rates, the location from which money is borrowed, and even
the company's business address."'
D. No Balancingof Interests
Tribal lending can be extremely harmful to consumers who enter
into contracts believing that the law protects them against abusive
lending and are unaware that a lender's affiliation with a tribe makes
it immune from Suit. 174 States have argued that "the equities weigh
168. Hudson & Heath, supra note 115.
169. Id. (noting that many payday lending websites "reveal nothing about who owns
them").
170. Leeds, supra note 162.
171. Id.
172. See WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.coml (last visited Nov. 15,
2012) ("WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is owned wholly by an individual Tribal Member
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and is not owned or operated by the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe or any of its political subdivisions. WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is a Native
American business operating within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation, a sovereign nation located within the United States of America.").
173. Heath, supra note 100.
174. See Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 582 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1997)) (noting that "immunity can
harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims").
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against applying tribal sovereign immunity in a state's action to
enforce its consumer protection laws" because consumer harms will
go unregulated. 7 5 Payday lenders intentionally prey on a particularly
vulnerable group of consumers who are unable to acquire credit and
believe they have nowhere else to turn.7 6 Regulators note that some
tribally owned companies use unfair practices that exceed those used
by the typical payday lender, including: continually harassing
borrowers in default through phone calls and mailings; disclosing
default information to employers and co-workers; claiming that they
are authorized to garnish wages; and hiding terms in contracts by
making them extremely difficult to understand."' Although courts
have been sympathetic to this argument, they are without authority to
rule in favor of states' equity interests because " 'sovereign immunity
is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy
depending on the equities of a given situation. . . .' Rather it presents

a pure jurisdictional question."s7 8 Consequently, this is a question for
the legislature and not for the courts."' Accordingly, courts continue
to stress that federal regulations to protect consumers against tribal
predatory lending practices are necessary.

IV.

FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION

A.

CongressionalAbrogation of Tribal Immunity
The Constitution does not guarantee tribal immunity from suit;
however, the Supreme Court has made clear that tribes are "domestic
dependent nations," and states may not intrude on their
175. Id. at 581.
176. Id.
177. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Action Halts Allegedly Illegal Tactics of
Payday Lending Operation That Attempted to Garnish Consumers' Paychecks (Sept. 12,
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/payday.shtm. Recently, the FTC has filed a
complaint against various payday lenders accused of breaking general federal lending laws
in the District of Nevada. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 1, Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. AMG Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00536 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 2012). While this may
address some of these concerns if the complaint proceeds past the pleading stage, the
action will only affect those practices which breach federal law and will have no effect on
state law. Additionally, this suit would only affect a few of the many companies using
these unfair practices. Id. at 3-12. Further, if successful this action would be brought by a
federal agency and would not affect the ability of states to bring actions for the same
practices.
178. Ameriloan, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582 (quoting Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court,
127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 715 (Ct. App. 2002)).
179. Id.
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sovereignty. 8 0 The Court, however, recognized that, because
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, it may eliminate or
limit tribal sovereign immunity through legislation. 81
Federal regulatory action is an important part of preventing
consumer harm, and the abrogation of sovereign immunity is one way
that this could be achieved. In order for sovereign immunity to be
waived by legislation, Congress must unequivocally express this
purpose.182 Courts strictly apply this standard and require a clear
finding that Congress manifested a legislative intent to abrogate
immunity. 83 To exhibit the requisite clarity, the regulation must not
only specifically apply to tribes, but it must also definitely mention
that tribes are subject to enforcement actions.184 Courts have refused
to enforce congressional regulations against tribes, even when they
have specifically noted that a law applies to tribes, if the law does not
clarify that tribes will also be subject to enforcement actions for
violating the law.18 1Courts have ruled, however, that the language of
other statutes meets the requisite clarity needed for courts to consider
a waiver unequivocal. 86 Accordingly, as long as Congress's legislation
reflects Court precedent, it is clear that Congress has the ability to
pass laws that would subject tribal lenders to regulation. However, it
is unclear whether Congress will be willing to impose such regulations
on payday lenders.
1. Likelihood of Congressional Regulation
Although Congress has the ability to regulate tribal payday
lenders, it is unlikely that it will actually do so for two reasons. First,
Congress seems to be largely unaware of the problem. Second,
Congress has been unwilling to regulate the payday lending industry
as a whole, leaving regulation to the states.
Congress's lack of knowledge about tribal payday lenders
originates from the minimal case law on the subject and the
180. CANBY, supra note 7, at 74-75.
181. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (stating that tribes are
"subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity").
182. See CANBY, supra note 7, at 74-75; CONFERENCE OFW. Arr'Ys GEN., supra note

21, at 296.
183. See CONFERENCE OF W. ATr'YS GEN., supra note 21, at 296.
184. See CANBY, supra note 7, at 100.
185. The Americans with Disabilities Act is an example of such a statute. See id.
186. See COHEN, supra note 77, at § 7.05fl[b1 (finding that Congress has abrogated the
immunity of tribes through various acts such as the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, and the Clean Water Act).
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regulation of payday lending at the state, rather than the federal level.
As stated earlier, because tribal immunity is a purely jurisdictional
question, actions against payday lenders rarely proceed further than
the pleading stage, despite the fact that most states claim to be aware
of tribal lenders' harmful practices.'" Based on the jurisdictional
nature of the inquiry, courts often dismiss these cases before they
hear any of the substantive issues in the complaint, which makes this
an inadequate avenue for bringing these matters to Congress's
attention."I
Though Congress is largely unaware of the issues presented by
tribal payday lenders, it is clear that Congress is aware of payday
lending industry practices as a whole. Members of Congress have
introduced various pieces of legislation targeting these companies,
beginning as far back as 2005; however, these attempts have been
largely unsuccessful."' Most of these attempts have languished in
committee, with the exception of the Military Lending Act of 2006,
which protects military personnel from predatory lending practices.190
Commentators contend that the failure to pass effective
legislation is largely due to the intense lobbying efforts of many
payday lenders.191 Payday lenders spend lavishly to create
relationships with members of Congress, targeting legislators on both
sides of the aisle to "beat back all attempts at consumer
protection."1 92 Research conducted by the Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington found that the amounts spent on lobbying
efforts have doubled since 2004, with campaign contributions from
these groups surpassing $1.5 million in 2008.'m Lobbyists for the
payday lending industry have notoriously targeted legislators,

187. See, e.g., Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 582 (Ct. App. 2008).
188. See, e.g., id
189. See, e.g., Predatory Payday Loan Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 1878, 109th Cong.
(2005) (containing legislation that was introduced and referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, but never became law).
190. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006); see also CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, POLICY
& LEGISLATION (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/researchanalysis/Summary-of-MLA.pdf.
191. See, e.g., Dan RatherReports, The Best Congress Money Can Buy (CBS television
broadcast 2007).
192. Id.
193. See Sewell Chan, A Consumer Bill Gives Exemption on Payday Loans, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/business/10regulate.html; Ryan
J. Reilly, Payday Loan Industry Doubles Lobbying Expenditures, TPM MUCKRAKER
(Mar. 15, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/payday
loan-industry-doubledlobbyinkexpenditures.php.
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attempting to halt legislation each time Congress introduces a bill,194
and it seems likely that these efforts will persist.
Moreover, Native Americans also use intense lobbying efforts
when Congress considers abrogating their immunity.19 s If evidence of
the tribal lobbying efforts used to protect Indian casinos is any
indication of what is to come if Congress moves to eliminate tribal
lending, 19 6 both tribal and payday lending lobbyists will likely join in
the fight to halt legislation.
It has long been a tenet of the Indian self-governance model that
one of the most important aspects of self-determination is the
promotion of the economic interests of the tribe' 97-which tribes
advance in support of allowing tribal businesses to remain
unregulated. Due to widely held tribal beliefs that the government
continues to erode tribal rights, there is a consistent lobbying
presence in Congress representing tribal interests.' 8 Commentators
report that tribes spend at least $50,000 annually in expenditures for
lobbying connected to tribal interests.'99 Accordingly, those seeking
to reform the payday lending industry should respond with their own
lobbying efforts. There is a clear need for federal regulation of tribal
lenders, but with no sign of a decrease in lobbying efforts, reformers
may have to find another way to regulate these lenders. Because
Congress explicitly issued authority to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB") to regulate payday lending, consumer
advocates are pushing this new agency to take action to regulate
lenders. 00

Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau Regulation
Congress delegated the authority to the CFPB to regulate
payday lenders through the Dodd-Frank Act. 201 Knowing that the
chances of Congress passing legislation regulating the payday lending

B.

194. Johnson, supranote 51, at 132-33.
195. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, How Indian Casino Interests Have
Learned the Art of Burying Influence in Washington, TIME, Dec. 23, 2003, at 52.
196. See id.
197. Lake, supra note 27, at 92.
198. Aaron F. W. Meck, Comment, The Conflict Between State Tests of Tribal Entity
Immunity and the CongressionalPolicy of Indian Self-Determination, 35 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 141,142-44 (2011).
199. Native American Resource Partners,Influence & Lobbying, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
2
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D00054378&cycle= 011 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2012).
200. See Chan, supra note 193.
201. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Hudson & Heath, supra note 115.
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industry are unlikely, states have reached out to the newly formed
CFPB to move toward regulation. The- CFPB is the right agency to
tackle the problem based on the Agency's purpose-Congress
created the Agency to provide an additional layer of oversight to
address issues that have escaped regulation.2 0 In fact, the CFPB's
newly appointed director, Richard Cordray, has promised to make
regulation of payday lending an Agency priority,2 0 saying that "the
illegal
halt
to
aggressively
move
will
agency
practices . . . by ... payday lenders." 2" The "field hearing" held on
the payday lending industry sought to gain information on industry
practices and provided evidence that Cordray is moving forward with
this promise. 20s Supporters of the industry, however, have expressed
concerns that, by eliminating all payday lenders, the CFPB will
eliminate all options for consumers seeking to obtain emergency
credit. 206 The CFPB has responded by stating that it "recognize[s] the
need for emergency credit" and that its objective is to help consumers
by targeting illegal and abusive practices, while not eliminating the
industry completely.2 07 At the very least, the CFPB will likely conduct
investigations into the practices of payday lenders-moving in the
direction of increased enforcement.20 8
Based on a payday lending field guide released to CFPB industry
examiners, the CFPB is only scrutinizing payday lenders based on the
federal laws already in place.2' While regulating breaches of federal
law is important, the guide mentions nothing about state law practices
or Indian tribe affiliations.2"o Additionally, even if the CFPB
202. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 1011, 124
Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010); see also Maya Jackson Randall, CFPB Chief Addresses Payday
19,
2012),
ST.
J.
(Jan.
Lenders,
WALL
242 930
.html.
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB10001424052970203750404577171292004
203. Ben Hallman, Richard Cordray, CFPB Chief Promises New Scrutiny Of Banks
2012),
20,
(Jan.
POST
HUFFINGTON
Loans,
Payday
Make
That
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/19/richard-cordray-cfpb-bank-paydayloansn 1216265.html.
204. Randall, supra note 202.
205. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Examines Payday Lending, CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Jan. 19,2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressrelease
/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-examines-payday-lending/.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, EXAMINATION
(2012),
LENDING
SMALL-DOLLAR
SHORT-TERM,
PROCEDURES,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Short-Term-Small-DollarLending-Examination-Manual.pdf (explaining that the objective of the examination is to
determine whether practices of lenders breach federal consumer laws).
209. See id.
210. Id.
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recognizes a company's tribal affiliation, many experts believe that
any attack on tribal entities will lead to long court battles concerning
tribal immunity standards. 2 11 This sheds light on a few unanswered
questions about the CFPB's ability to regulate tribal lenders: whether
a regulatory agency has the authority to waive tribal immunity;
whether the CFPB will become aware of the problem; and whether a
CFPB regulation will address state laws.
1. Ability of CFPB to Regulate Tribes
Courts consider Congress's plenary power to regulate tribal
immunity a vague standard, which will likely require the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the standard's precise meaning. The CFPB
will probably argue that Congress's plenary power extends to federal
agencies based on administrative law principles.212 Consequently,
tribes will likely contest the CFPB's ability to abrogate immunity
based on the delegation of authority given to the agency through the
Dodd-Frank Act.
Based on the limited case law addressing whether Congress's
authority to abrogate tribal immunity extends to agencies, it is
difficult to determine whether a court would uphold enforcement
actions or rules created by the CFPB directed at payday lenders.
Cases have shown that, when an agency issues a regulation, "its
validity depends upon its being within the statutory authority
Congress conferred upon the regulating agency.""' Accordingly, a
court will have to determine what authority Congress conferred on
the CFPB.
Based on the statutory language in the Dodd-Frank Act, the
purpose of the CFPB is to "seek to implement and.

. .

enforce

Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets ... and that
markets for consumer financial products and services are fair,
transparent, and competitive."" The objective of ensuring that
"6consumers are protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and
practices and from discrimination" is particularly applicable to
payday lenders.215 Congress granted the CFPB rulemaking authority
211. Hudson & Heath, supra note 115.
212. Based on the non-delegation doctrine, it is clear that Congress may delegate its
power to an agency as long as it is pursuant to some "intelligible principle." See Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
213. CANBY, supra note 7, at 285.
214. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (Supp. 2011).
215. Id. § 5511(b)(2).
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to "prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be
necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and
carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer
financial laws."216 Further, the Act gives the CFPB authority to
prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices under federal law.217
The CFPB "may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or
service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive
acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer
for a consumer financial product or service,""" which suggests that
the CFPB has the authority to pass regulations further restricting
payday lending practices.
It is difficult, however, to determine whether the Dodd-Frank
Act and any payday lending regulations created under the Act will
apply to tribes. Jurisdictions vary in interpreting how statutes apply to
tribes, as well as their requirements for when a statute has waived
immunity.2 19 The Dodd-Frank Act is a federal statute of general
applicability based on tests formulated by courts to determine when a
statute has abrogated immunity.220 Tests applied by courts finding
abrogation based on federal statutes of general applicability, such as
the Dodd-Frank Act, vary depending on the statute's clarity in its
application to tribes.221 Where statutes clearly encompass tribes and
impose a method of judicial enforcement, "courts appear uniform in
finding congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity."22 2
Conversely, courts are less likely to find abrogation where a statute's
scope does not clearly encompass tribes.223 Without any case squarely
in line with the wording of the Dodd-Frank Act, it is necessary to
determine the Act's appropriate place within these two categories.
While the statute's wording arguably places the Dodd-Frank Act
within the former category, there is also an argument that the statute
should be included among the latter.224 Although jurisdictions vary in
determining these issues, it is probable that the Dodd-Frank Act
216. Id. § 5512(b)(1).
217. Id. § 5531(a).
218. Id. § 5531(b).
219. CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 21, at 296-97.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 297.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Blake Sims & Justine Hosie, Tribal Loans to State Residents-The Next Test of
Sovereign Immunity, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Winter 2011,
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL230000pub/newsletter/201112/sims-hos
ie.pdf.
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constitutes abrogation of immunity regardless of the category chosen
for this particular statute.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act imposes a method of judicial
enforcement both at the federal and state level, 2" the Act's
applicability to tribes is more ambiguous than statutes in previous
judicial opinions. Under the statute, the CFPB has enforcement
authority against "covered persons" who provide payday loans.226 The
Act defines a "covered person" as "any person that engages in
offering or providing a consumer financial product or service."-2 The
Act then defines "person" as "an individual, partnership, company,
corporation, [or] association." 228 Thus, a company or corporation
providing a payday loan is clearly subject to enforcement under the
Act. Although these definitions in themselves do not mention
anything about tribal entities, the act defines "State" as including
"any federally recognized Indian tribe."2 Consequently, in relation
to this Act, tribes are equivalent to states; accordingly, tribes should
be subject to the same legal standards that courts would apply to
state-owned corporations. Although this reasoning may appear farflung, courts have found similar reasoning-namely, linking
definitions advanced in the statutes-to clearly encompass tribes in
terms of enforcement.3 0 If a court accepts this rationale, the correct
determination would be to apply the immunity standard used for state
businesses in assessing the immunity of tribal payday lenders. The
provision giving state regulators authority to bring civil actions under
the Act, in the name of a state, "with respect to any entity that is
State-chartered,"' provides additional support for this reasoning.
225. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c) (Supp. 2011) (federal); 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (Supp. 2011)
(state).
226. Id. § 5514(c)(1).
227. Id. § 5481(6).
228. Id. § 5481(19).
229. Id. § 5481(27).
230. See Atlantic States Legal Fund. v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 827 F.
Supp. 608,609 (D. Ariz. 1993).
Under the RCRA, citizens are permitted to bring compliance suits 'against any
person (including (a) the United States and (b) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency...) who is alleged to be in violation....'42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(A). 'Person' is subsequently defined to include municipalities. 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15). Municipalities include 'an Indian tribe or authorized tribal
organization....' 42 U.S.C.S. § 6903(13)(A). ... [t]he text and history of the
RCRA clearly indicates congressional intent to abrogate the Tribe's sovereign
immunity with respect to violations of the RCRA.
Id
231. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
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Due to the explicit definition of "State" in this title, this would
include actions against tribally chartered corporations.
Applying the state immunity standard, states are immune from
private suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 23 2 However, this
immunity does not extend to suits against states by other states or the
federal government.233 The waiver of immunity with respect to states
and the federal government was a necessary consequence of
ratification of the Constitution 2 34-tribes did not assume this same
consequence, however, because they did not ratify the Constitution.
This recognition may stand against a court's acceptance of treating
tribes as states under the statute. On the other hand, it is clearly
within congressional power to control Indian affairs 236-this law could
merely reflect that plenary power. Thus, if "tribe" is synonymous with
"state," then the tribe will be immune from private actions, but not
those actions by the federal or state government enforcing the DoddFrank Act. This is important because the standard applies equally to
state-owned corporations.
There may be a problem, however, with the power of the states
to bring enforcement actions. The statute allows the attorney general
of the state to bring enforcement actions in the name of the state
against a company in violation of this law." The Constitution
establishes that states may bring actions against other states in federal
courts.23 8 However, Congress has further qualified the original
jurisdiction of a controversy between two states, requiring that the
Supreme Court hear these actions. 239 The provision in the DoddFrank Act allowing a state attorney general to bring enforcement
actions clearly holds that these actions must be brought in federal
district court, not in the Supreme Court. 240 Yet, this should not
present an obstacle for states bringing actions in district courts
because the requirement of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction is

232. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
233. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
234. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
235. See A History of the Bill of Rights, AM. C.L. UNION OF FLA.,
http://www.aclufl.org/take-action/download-resources/info-papers/9.cfm (last visited Nov.
15,2012).
236. See supraPart I.B.
237. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
238. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
239. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
240. 12 U.S.C. § 5552.
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statutory and not constitutionally guaranteed.2 4' Thus, it is within
Congress's power to waive this jurisdictional requirement.
If a court does not accept that this statute clearly encompasses
tribes, the appropriate standard for determining its applicability to
tribes is that used for actions brought by the federal government,
including government agencies. A statute of general applicability may
apply to Indian tribes, unless it "(1) . . .touches 'exclusive rights of

in purely intramural matters'; (2) the
self-governance
application ... would 'abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties';
or (3) there is proof 'by legislative history or some other means that
Clearly,
Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians. . ..
this is not a purely intramural matter because the business seeks to
provide loans to non-tribal consumers. 24 3 Additionally, this does not
seem to eliminate treaty rights, nor is there anything in the legislative
history to show that the Dodd-Frank Act should not apply to tribes.
Thus, at least when the CFPB brings an action, tribes should be
subject to enforcement.
Enforcement will present a problem, however, if state regulators
seek to bring an action pursuant to their enforcement authority under
the statute because tribes are immune from state enforcement
actions. 2 " However, the language that allows the state to bring
enforcement actions against "state-chartered" corporations should
give more leeway in allowing these actions, which is a question that a
court will ultimately need to decide. At a minimum, even if a court
does not find that this statute encompasses tribes under the first
standard, the CFPB should have enforcement authority to ensure that
tribal payday lenders comply with the Act.
Although this does not solve the problem of state law
circumvention, at the very least, tribes would have to comply with all
federal laws under the Act. As a recent FTC complaint alleges,245 the
FTC has recognized that tribal lenders are known to violate many

241. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
242. E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
243. See id. at 1079 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113,
1116 (9th Cir. 1985) ("fTlhe tribal self-government exception is designed to except purely
intramural matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and
domestic relations from the general rule.").
244. See supra Part IV.B.1.
245. FTC Action Halts Allegedly Illegal Tactics of Payday Lending Operation that
Attempted to GarnishConsumers' Paychecks, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 12,2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/payday.shtm.
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federal lending laws by using illegal lending tactics. 24 6 Additionally, it
is within the CFPB's rulemaking authority to make rules concerning
"unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s]."247 Under these provisions,
payday lending practices are arguably unfair because they cause
substantial injury to consumers and are abusive because they
interfere with consumer's ability to understand terms, while taking
unreasonable advantage of consumers. 248 One substantial restriction
on the CFPB, however, is that it is not given the authority to set usury
rates for payday loans. 249 Thus, if this is the ultimate goal in restricting
payday lending, the solution will need to rest with Congress.
Notwithstanding this fact, there are various measures that states have
used to combat payday lending, short of setting interest rate capsincluding limits on the number of loans a person can take out,
disclosure requirements, fees associated with loans, collection
practices, and various other loan terms.250 Furthermore, although the
state laws may not be enforced by bringing actions under the DoddFrank Act, regulators would be able to use the discovery found in
those proceedings to prove that these are sham businesses and not
legitimate arms of the tribe. Because the Act does not alter state laws
that provide greater protection to consumers, once states discover
information proving that a company is not an arm of the tribe, state
regulators can bring actions against companies that are not complying
with state consumer protection laws.25' Additionally, the CFPB has
the power to further define "covered persons" subject to the Act and
may use that authority to more concretely include tribal lenders,
making interpretation issues less ambiguous for courts.252
2. Likelihood of CFPB Regulation
If the CFPB has the authority to bring enforcement actions
against tribal payday lenders, it remains unclear whether they will
take that step. For the same reasons Congress is largely unaware of
the problem, 253 it is likely that the CFPB will similarly be unaware of
the tribal ownership of many payday lenders. Moreover, if the CFPB
246. While the complaint itself does not allege that tribes own these companies, the
named companies in the complaint are tribes that have used the tribal defense in state
court actions.
247. 12 U.S.C. §5531(a) (Supp. 2011).
248. See id.
249. Id. § 5517(o).
250. See supra Part IA.
251. 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
252. Id. § 5514(a)(2).
253. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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becomes vocal about its crackdown on payday lenders, tribal lenders
will likely continue to use elaborate ploys to conceal their identities
and further evade new consumer protection regulations.2 5 4 On the
other hand, Congress created the CFPB as another means to address
the failure of federal oversight regarding abuses against consumers;
thus, it is more likely that the CFPB will conduct investigations that
are more thorough and will recognize the problems associated with
tribal lenders.
C. Issues ConfrontingRegulation
Even if Congress or the CFPB decides to regulate payday
lending at the federal level, this will fail to address many states'
concerns. States currently regulate payday lending, and this
regulation greatly differs among states. Some states completely
prohibit the practice-as is the case in New York, which has a
mandated APR cap of twenty-five percent 25 5-while others set
additional restrictions, such as capping interest rates, limiting the loan
terms, or capping the amount of loans an individual is able to take
out.256 Still others, such as Wyoming, apply no restrictions to the
industry.2 57 Consumer advocates continue to press for regulations
setting an interest rate cap, with most calling for a thirty-six percent
APR cap,258 which is consistent with the "widely accepted benchmark
for small loans." 259 Payday lending advocates respond to regulators by
arguing that "[a]ll companies that loan to consumers should be under
the same rule of law and should have to comply with the same
consumer protection requirements so that you have consistent,
across-the-board protections to restrain predatory lending and highcost lending."2 60 While the CFPB would be unable to set this cap,26 ' if
Congress decides to follow this advice and set a thirty-six percent cap,
254. Hudson & Heath,supra note 115.
255. Hearing on Foreclosure, Predatory Lending and Payday Lending in America's
Cities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Domestic Reform, 110th Cong. 165 (2007) (statement of Jean Ann Fox, Director of
Consumer Protection, Consumer Federal of America).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 7-8.

258. Policy & Legislation, supra note 190, at 2.
259. LAUREN K. SAUNDERS ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOPPING THE
PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT DON'T 1 (2010)
availableat http://www.nclc.org/issues/payday-loans.html.

260. Wayne Greene, Regulators in Dispute Over Internet Payday Loans by Tribes,
TULSA WORLD (Oct. 25,2011,4:09 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx
?subjectid=336&articleid=20111025_16_Al1Intern472461.
261. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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this regulation will still be inadequate for many states-namely those
who have been successful in passing strict regulations that have
eliminated the industry all together. Additionally, a federal regulation
would likely be less protective for consumers, based on other types of
restrictions, than the laws used in many states.
If Congress or the CFPB takes on the task of regulating the
industry, they should consider this problem in the rulemaking stage
before loopholes become apparent. One available option is for the
CFPB to issue a regulation setting national restrictions while
deferring to any state laws that provide greater protection-an
approach that Congress used in the Volunteer Protection Act passed
in 1997.262 The language of this law reads that it "shall not preempt
any State law that provides additional protection." 263 Additionally, in
order to meet the Supreme Court's standards, the regulation would
have to unequivocally state that Indian tribes are subject to
enforcement actions for violations of the act, at both the state and
federal level. In doing so, this regulation would be a clear step toward
eliminating the harmful practices characteristic of the tribal payday
lending industry.
CONCLUSION
While a reevaluation of tribal immunity standards in the context
of today's increasingly integrated economy is necessary, it is unlikely
that Congress will address these issues in the near future. Because
Congress is unlikely to reform immunity standards, regulators will
have to work with the standards already in place to combat this
problem. As the above discussion demonstrates, it is evident that
there is a dire need for reform to protect against predatory tribal
lenders.
Although there is no perfect option for addressing these
problems, the CFPB is the agency most able to pass reform that will
adequately address state regulation problems. In examining agency
rules that have successfully regulated tribal entities, a regulation
passed by the CFPB in this area would fall within this unequivocal
congressional abrogation standard set by the Supreme Court. Payday
lending is within the authority of the CFPB, as delegated to it by
Congress. As long as the CFPB follows the proper standards, it could
be a significant force in ending tribal lenders' harmful reach.
262. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14502 (2006)).
263. § 14502.
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As these companies continue to grow and gain more attention, if
regulators cannot halt these practices, it is likely that the strategy will
expand into other product and service markets that are restricted by
state regulation. Although it remains unclear what a rule should look
like, what is clear is that regulation is necessary. While the
importance of protecting Native American rights is evident, federal
regulators must weigh those interests against the interests of
American consumers to be free from predatory practices. When
companies use tribal immunity as a method to circumvent consumer
protection laws-rather than as a method to sustain selfgovernance-regulators should prioritize consumers' rights over
tribal rights and take decisive, corrective action to protect the public
from harm.
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